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I. INTRODUCTION
In light of persistent poverty and the limited success of existing
mainstream attempts to ameliorate it, this Article responds to two
questions: (1) What other solutions beyond those already tried can and
should be employed to reduce poverty? and (2) What can legal scholars,
lawyers, law schools, law school clinics, law students, and advocates for
poor people do (beyond what they are already doing) to reduce poverty?
To answer the first question, we must establish a more inclusive
capitalism by democratizing “capital acquisition with the earnings of
capital” 1 based on the principles of “binary economics.” 2 This
* Robert Ashford is Professor of Law at Syracuse University, College of Law, where he teaches or
has taught courses in Business Associations, Business Planning, Public Corporations, Professional
Responsibility, Secured Transactions, Securities Regulation, and a seminar in Inclusive Capitalism,
Property Rights, and Binary Economics. He holds a J.D. with honors from Harvard Law School and
a B.A. with majors in physics and English literature, graduating first in his class at the University of
South Florida. He was a Woodrow Wilson Fellow at Stanford University. He is a leading authority
in socio-economics and binary economics.
Professor Ashford is the founder and principal organizer of the Section on Socio-Economics of the
Association of American Law Schools, the Society of Socio-Economists, and a member of the
academic honor societies of Phi Kappa Phi and Sigma Pi Sigma (physics), the American Law
Institute, and the Athens Institute for Education and Research. He has served on the Editorial Board
of the Journal of Socio-Economics, the Executive Council of the Society for the Advancement of
Socio-Economics, the Board of Advisors of the Syracuse University College of Law, and the Board
of Directors of the Bar Association of San Francisco.
Professor Ashford has authored and co-authored articles, book chapters and monographs on various
subjects including banking, binary economics, evidence, implied liability under federal law,
professional responsibility, public utility regulation, socio-economics, securities regulation, and tax
law.
He has lectured at universities and conferences in Australia, Canada, Greece, France, Italy,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and throughout the U.S.A.1. In this Article, “capital” includes
land, animals, structures, machines, tools, sources of energy (such as coal, oil, and solar panels),
patents, copyrights, and other intangibles—anything capable of being owned and employed in
production. It does not include “financial capital,” which is a claim on, or ownership interest in, real
capital after liabilities incurred in the employment of real capital are paid. Thus, as used in this
article, “capital” might also be referred to as “real capital” or “capital assets” to distinguish it from
“financial capital.” There is considerable confusion manifest in economic and financial discourse
regarding the important distinction between real and financial writing and discourse. If one were
referring to “human capital” but did not use the adjective “human” the speaker would be properly
criticized for being misleading. Yet, economic and financial writing and discourse frequently use
the word “capital” sometimes to mean “real capital” and sometimes to mean “financial capital”
(sometimes in the same sentence) without distinguishing between the two. In this article, the term
“real capital” will be used occasionally to distinguish it from financial capital.
2. The approach that came to be known as binary economics (and that the author prefers to
call “inclusive capitalism”) was first advanced in the writings of corporate finance attorney,
investment banker, and philosopher, Louis Kelso. LOUIS O. KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE
CAPITALIST MANIFESTO (1958); LOUIS O. KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE NEW CAPITALISTS:
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democratization requires extending to poor and middle class people
competitive access to the same government-supported institutions of
corporate finance, banking, insurance, reinsurance and the favorable tax
and monetary policies that are presently available primarily to people
and businesses to acquire capital with the present and future earnings of
capital substantially in proportion to their existing wealth. 3 With this
democratization, participation in capital acquisition with the earnings of
capital by the vast majority of poor and middle class people would no
longer be limited as a practical matter by their meager or even negative
net worth.
This democratization would transform the existing system of
corporate finance that presently functions primarily to concentrate
capital ownership, into a more inclusive ownership-broadening system
of corporate finance. It would require no taxes, redistribution,
borrowing, or government command. Corporations would be free to
continue to meet their capital requirements as before, but they would
have an additional, more inclusive, ownership-broadening, and perhaps
even potentially more profitable, market means to do so. This additional
means could be voluntarily employed to:
1. reduce poverty, welfare dependence, and fear of poverty by
substantially enhancing the earning capacity of poor and middle class
people (by supplementing their labor income and any transfer
payments they may receive increasingly with capital income);
2. reduce tax rates, taxes, and the need for government expenditures;
3. enhance the earning capacity of the participating companies, their
shareholders, their employees, and their customers;
4. reduce unemployment, raise wages, and enhance working
conditions;
5. enhance the value of equity investments and retirement plans; and
A PROPOSAL TO FREE ECONOMIC GROWTH FROM THE SLAVERY OF SAVINGS (1961); LOUIS O.
KELSO & PATRICIA HETTER, TWO FACTOR THEORY: THE ECONOMICS OF REALITY (1967); LOUIS O.
KELSO & PATRICIA HETTER KELSO, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC POWER: EXTENDING THE ESOP
REVOLUTION THROUGH BINARY ECONOMICS (1991). The authoritative and most complete source of
writings by Louis Kelso can be found on the website of the Kelso Institute. See THE KELSO
INSTITUTE, http://kelsoinstitute.org/louiskelso/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
3. Although all people, whether rich or poor, have the legal right to acquire capital with the
present and future earnings of capital, without the economic understanding and market reforms
advanced in this article, for the most poor or middle class people, the practical consequence of this
right is trivial. Although the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) boasts over fifty million stockholders, the median stockholder is a 46-year-old male with a portfolio worth less than $20,000 that
provides dividend income of less than $1000 annually.
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6. reduce the risk of borrowing;
7. promote more sustainable, environmentally friendly growth; and
8. enhance the creditworthiness of national governments and their
ability to raise revenue.

The answer to the second question is for legal scholars, lawyers,
law students, law school clinicians and administrators, and other
advocates for the people (1) first to learn and to teach (a) the underlying
principles of inclusive capitalism based on binary economics, (b) how
this democratization of capital acquisition with the earnings of capital
can be practically implemented, and (c) how this democratization is a
necessary part of any systemic solution to poverty and (2) then to
advocate, work for, and facilitate its implementation.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of inclusive capitalism
based on binary economics and explains how (compared to the
mainstream understanding of economics) it provides a deeper
understanding of the cause of poverty that prevails despite the greatly
increasing growth in per-capita productive capacity beginning with the
Industrial Revolution and continuing throughout subsequent
technological developments up to present times. Part III explains how
corporate fiduciary duties call for the reform and use of existing
institutions of corporate finance to achieve the results described above.
Part IV sets forth additional steps legal scholars, lawyers, law schools,
legal clinics, and law students can do to help. Part V provides a brief
conclusion.
II. OVERVIEW OF INCLUSIVE CAPITALISM BASED ON BINARY
ECONOMICS
To understand how capital acquisition with the present and future
earnings of capital can be democratized to produce the results described
above, it is first necessary to understand three inter-related foundational
premises:
1. Both labor and (real) capital do work and (via property rights,
4
including financial capital) distribute income;

4. The assertion that (real) capital does work does not negate the fact that both capital and
labor are generally needed to complete specific kinds of work or the fact that labor is needed to
invent, build, install, operate, maintain, store, repair, manage, and finance capital. But the labor
work involved in inventing, building, creating, installing, operating, maintaining, storing, repairing,
managing, and financing capital is not the work of the capital itself. It is important emphasize that,
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2. Although advancing technology is widely understood to make labor
more productive, it may also be understood to make capital more
productive than labor in task after task (which helps to explain why
profitable corporations continually employ capital to replace and
vastly supplement the work of labor); and
3. The prospect of a broader distribution of capital acquisition with
the present and future earnings of capital carries with it the prospect
of more broadly distributed capital earnings in future years, which in
turn will provide the market incentives to profitably employ more
labor and capital in earlier years. In other words, the more broadly
capital is acquired with the present and future earnings of capital
(through borrowing, via capital credit), the more an economy will
grow.

The third of these premises (the principle of “binary growth”) identifies
a distinct cause of economic growth that is based on the distribution of
capital acquisition with the present and future earnings of capital. The
binary approach is distinct in that it is not found in the work of Adam
Smith and all other economic approaches based on its foundation.
As employed in a theory of growth, the recognition that capital does
work and distributes income, is made more productive than labor as
technology advances, and contributes to growth via the distribution of
income is fundamentally different from the conventional view, based on
Adam Smith’s understanding of growth (and continuing in the history of
economic thought to the present day).5 This conventional view assumes that
the primary role of capital in contributing to per capita economic growth
is indirect by increasing labor productivity (thereby making labor more
productive and enabling the employment of more workers). In contrast,
the binary view focuses on the increasing productiveness of capital
resulting from technological advance and the broader distribution of its
ownership. 6

according to the binary approach, financial capital does not do work, but is a claim on the work
done by (earnings of) real capital.
5. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS, 1776 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976).
6. Robert Ashford, Unutilized Productive Capacity, Binary Economics and the Case for Broadening
Capital Ownership, 10 ECON., MGMT., & FIN. MKTS. 11, 24-25 (2015); Robert Ashford, Beyond Austerity and
Stimulus: Democratizing Capital Acquisition with the Earnings of Capital as a Means to
Sustainable Growth, 36 J. POST-KEYNESIAN ECON. 179, 182 (2013); See generally Robert Ashford,
Ralph P. Hall & Nicholas A. Ashford, Broadening Capital Acquisition with the Earnings of Capital
as a Means of Sustainable Growth and Environmental Sustainability, THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL
REVIEW 70-74, Oct-Nov 2012. See also ROBERT ASHFORD & RODNEY SHAKESPEARE, BINARY
ECONOMICS: THE NEW PARADIGM (1999).
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A. Productivity and Productiveness Distinguished
Consider, for example, the work of sawing boards. Suppose a
person can saw 10 boards per hour with a handsaw and 100 boards per
hour with a machine saw. Working with a machine saw rather than a hand
saw, the worker can saw ten times as many boards in the same time and
therefore is said to be ten times as productive and to have ten times the
productivity. One can also say that capital productivity has also increased
by a factor of ten. But when sawing each board with the machine saw,
the sawyer (i.e., the human worker) is doing much less work. Per
unit of production, the sawyer’s work (i.e., labor productiveness) has
decreased and the work (i.e., the capital productiveness) of the saw (i.e.,
the capital worker) has increased. And given the total production done in
one hour, the machine saw is doing essentially all of the extra work.
Thus, there is another (binary) way to understand the primary role of
capital in contributing to per capita economic growth: namely, to do an
increasing portion of the total work done.
Thus, inclusive capitalism based on binary economics distinguishes
between:
1. productivity (which is the ratio of the output of all factors of
production, divided by the input of one factor, usually labor); and
2. productiveness (a special focus of binary economics, which
retrospectively means “work done” and prospectively means
“productive capacity”).

The productiveness of capital is more clearly revealed in the work
hauling sacks: (1) a person can haul one sack one mile in one hour and is
exhausted; (2) with a horse, 10 sacks can be hauled four times as far
(yielding a forty-fold increase in production), and (3) with a truck, 500
sacks can be hauled forty times as far (yielding a 20,000-fold increase in
production). According to the binary perspective, the horse and truck do
more than increase labor productivity; the horse and truck are doing
essentially all of the extra work. 7
Accordingly, per capita growth can be understood not only as
capital increasing labor productivity but can also be understood as
capital doing an ever increasing portion of the total work done and as
being capable of distributing (via property rights) an increasing portion
of the income derived from production. 8 Thus, although the concepts of
labor and capital productivity are very helpful in enabling employers to
7.
8.

Beyond Austerity, supra note 6, at 183.
Id. at 184.
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decide what mix of labor and capital can be most profitably employed to
produce goods and services, the prospect of “rising productivity” does
not reveal how much more work each factor does and how much each
factor will earn from that employment. Indeed, in recent years, measures
of labor productivity have been rising; but compared to the earnings of
capital, labor’s share of national income has been declining. 9 So with the
great emphasis that conventional economics places on rising
productivity as a fundamental cause of growth, the conventional analysis
can be very confusing and misleading to poor and middle class people
and their advocates. The binary concept of productiveness more clearly
reveals who or what is doing the work and earning the income. To
luddites and their sympathizers, 10 the focus on productiveness may seem
to work contrary to the interests of poor and middle class people.
However as the following analysis reveals, quite the opposite is true.
If one adopts the binary view that capital does work, then its role in
production, income distribution, and growth must be clearly understood.
Based on its productiveness, capital has six powers important to
production, income distribution, and growth: Specifically, capital can:
1. “replace labor (doing what was formerly done by labor);
2. vastly supplement the work of labor by doing much more of the kind
of work that humans can do;
3. vastly supplement the work of labor by doing work that labor alone
can never do (e.g. technological devices can unleash forces that create
computer chips that cannot be made by hand; chickens lay eggs and

9. Josef C. Brada, The distribution of income between labor and capital is not stable: But
why
is
that
so
and
why
does
it
matter?, 37
ECON.
SYS.,
(2013),
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0939362513000393 (last visited Mar. 29, 2016);
See generally Francisco Rodriguez & Ariun Jayadev, The Declining Labor Share of Income, 3
UNITED
NATIONS
DEV.
PROGRAMME
(2012),
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/
default/files/hdrp_2010_36.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2016); See generally Susanto Basu, Brent
Nieman, The decline of the U.S. labor share: Comment, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY 55 (2013); Margaret Jacobson & Filippo Occhino, Labor’s Declining Share of Income
and Rising Inequality, FED. RES. BANK OF CLEVELAND (Sept. 25, 2012),
https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/publications/economic-commentary/2012economic-commentaries/ec-201213-labors-declining-share-of-income-and-rising-inequality.aspx
(last visited Mar. 29, 2016; Loukas Karabarbounis & Brent Neiman, The Global Decline of the
Labor Share, 129 THE QUARTERLY J. OF ECON., 61 (2013).
10. In response to the growing mechanization in the mid to late Nineteenth Century,
displaced workers, known as “luddites,” were driven to greater poverty, and became skeptical about
the long-run economic promise that technology creates more jobs than it destroys, in turn they
attached and destroyed the machines that were putting them out of work. See generally
KIRKPATRICK SALE, REBELS AGAINST THE FUTURE: THE LUDDITES AND THEIR WAR ON THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (1996).
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fruit trees make fruit while all farmers can do is assist in the process);
4. vastly supplement the work of labor by working without labor (as in
the case of washing machines, vending machines, automatic bank
tellers and toll takers, automated factories, all forms of robotics, and
fruit-bearing trees);
5. pay for itself with its future earnings (the basic rule of business
investment); and
6. distribute income roughly equal to the value of its output”

11

The first four powers concern what might be considered the “real
economy” powers of capital; the latter two are powers that are most
clearly revealed in a private-property, market economy with a stable
credit system protected by a reliable legal system. 12 From the binary
perspective, each of the productive capacities of capital contributes to
per capita economic growth in ways above and beyond any increase
caused by increasing labor productivity.
B. The Work of Capital Vastly Supplements the Work of Labor
From the foregoing consideration of the six identified powers of
capital, it follows that characterizing the per capita growth impact of
increasingly capital-intensive production as the result of the substitution of
capital for labor is a fundamentally misleading concept (just as is the
characterization that per capita growth is the result of increasing labor
productivity). In considering the accumulating wealth of nations that Smith
was trying to explain in 1776, 13 and in explaining the far greater
accumulation of wealth that has continued to the present day, the work of
capital has done (and continues to do) far more than increase labor
productivity and substitute for the work of labor. In reality, the work of capital
not only substitutes for, but also vastly supplements, the work of labor by
doing ever more of the work.
C. Production (Work) is Income
It is no less true in an economy of billions of people than on
Robinson Crusoe’s island, that work (i.e., production) is income, whether
done by labor or capital. Accordingly, capital works on both sides of the
production-consumption economic equation by providing vastly
11.
12.
13.

Beyond Austerity, supra note 6, at 187.
Id.
Id. at 188.
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increased:
(1) productive capacity and production; and
(2) capacity to distribute income and leisure.

14

The recognition that (1) technology makes capital more productive than
labor in task after task and (2) production is income reveals that one
important effect of technological advance is to ever increase the direct
contribution of capital to production and the distribution of income.
D. Policy Implications of Inclusive Capitalism based on Binary
Economic Analysis: Mainstream and Binary Strategies Compared
The differences in the conventional and binary conceptions of the
role of capital and labor in production, income distribution, and growth
lead to important policy differences regarding (1) how economic growth
can be more effectively promoted, (2) how people can best participate in
this growth, and (3) how the problem of poverty can most effectively be
reduced.
If one adopts the conventional economic view―that the role of
capital in promoting growth occurs indirectly via labor productivity
giving rise to increased distribution of income via wages 15―then the
distribution of capital acquisition and ownership has no fundamental
positive relationship to income distribution, the reduction of poverty, the
fuller employment of labor and capital, and growth. This conventional
economic analysis holds whether one adopts a classical, Marxist,
neoclassical, or Keynesian approach. In contrast, if one adopts the binary
view that with technological advance, capital is doing ever more of the
work and capable of distributing even more of the income, then whether
the distribution of capital acquisition, and therefore ownership and
income, is broadened or remains concentrated becomes an increasingly
important factor in promoting or suppressing both (1) broader income
distribution to poor and middle class people; and (2) economic growth.
As long as the conventional productivity view goes unchallenged,
the mainstream approach will continue to assume that the gains from
technological advance for most people must come in the form of more
jobs and higher wages, lower prices for goods and services, and welfare
payments derived from redistributing the labor and capital income of
others. 16 Without sacrificing any of these gains, binary economists, on
14.
15.
16.
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the other hand, see far greater potential gains for poor and middle class
people by enabling them (without redistribution) to supplement their
gains resulting from wages, lower prices, and welfare, by adding to their
participation in the economy via capital acquisition with the earnings of
capital just as well-capitalized people routinely do. 17
Accordingly, until it is effectively challenged and ultimately
replaced, the mainstream strategy for promoting economic recovery,
fuller employment of labor and capital, and economic growth will
remain a composite mainstream left- and right-wing mix of government
policies to promote (1) capital acquisition with the earnings of capital
primarily for corporations and well-capitalized persons (generally in
proportion to their existing wealth); and (2) primarily jobs (but by no
means the best or highest paying jobs) and various forms of welfare
redistribution for poor and middle class people.
According to the binary view, in a market economy in which
production is becoming ever more capital-intensive, sufficient earning
capacity to purchase all that can be increasingly produced by increasingly
capital-intensive production, cannot be distributed by jobs, job creation
programs, and welfare alone. 18 The missing element in these strategies
(that could easily be added to the mix without redistributing or taxing
anyone’s income or wealth) is an understanding of the need to open the
existing system of corporate finance to provide poor and middle-class
people with practical, competitive access to the same institutions of
corporate finance, banking, insurance, loans and guaranties, and
favorable tax and monetary policy (presently routinely provided to wellcapitalized corporations and people to acquire capital with the earnings
of capital substantially in proportion to their existing wealth) so that

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, (1993), https://www.census.gov/prod/1/statbrief/sb93_14.pdf (last visited
Mar. 29, 2016); see also Scott Andes & Jonathan Rothwell, Advanced Industries Drive Down
Prices, Making Income More Valuable, BROOKINGS: THE AVENUE (Mar. 27, 2015 9:34 AM)
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/the-avenue/posts/2015/03/27-advanced-industries-drive-downprices-andes-rothwell (last visited Mar. 29, 2016.
17. For background and positive review of binary economics, see, e.g., Norman. G. Kurland,
A New Look at Prices and Money: The Kelsonian Binary Model for Achieving Rapid Growth
Without Inflation, 30 J. SOC.-ECON. 495 (2001); Jerry Gauche, Binary Modes for the Privatization
of Public Assets, 27 J. SOC.-ECON. 445 (1998); Stephen V. Kane, The Theory of Productiveness: A
Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Analysis of Binary Growth and Output in the Kelso System, 29
J. SOC.-ECON. 541 (2000); Geoffrey D. Korff, Reviving the Forgotten American Dream, 113 PENN
ST. L. REV. 417 (2008).
18. See Ashford, Unutilized Productive Capacity, supra note 6, at 20; Ashford, Beyond Austerity and
Stimulus, supra note 6, at 193; Ashford, Hall & Ashford, Broadening Capital Acquisition with the
Earnings of Capital, supra note 6, at 71; ASHFORD & SHAKESPEARE, Binary Economics: The New
Paradigm, supra note 6; Kurland, supra note 17, at 504; Gauche, supra note 17, at 449.
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poor and middle-class people can also enhance their earning capacity
by way of capital acquisition with the earnings of capital but in
proportions not limited by their existing wealth. 19 As explained below,
major credit-worthy companies are uniquely positioned to provide this
inclusive access in a profitable way. Their incentives for doing so in the
aggregate on the macroeconomic level are discussed below in Part III, Sections
A through H. Their incentives for doing so on the microeconomic level and
ways to overcome the related first-actor-collective-action
impediments are discussed below in Part III, Sections I through K.
III. MAJOR CORPORATIONS, CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES, AND
BROADENING CAPITAL ACQUISITION WITH THE EARNINGS OF CAPITAL
The ownership-broadening approach advanced in this Article does
not require corporations to undertake a policy of inclusive, ownershipbroadening “binary financing.” The decision by corporations of whether
or not to broaden their ownership remains private and voluntary. Yet, in
light of the principle of binary growth and the duty of corporate
fiduciaries to maximize corporate wealth, there is reason to believe that
as the principle of binary growth becomes more widely understood, the
incentives and fiduciary duty to broaden corporate share ownership may
become increasingly attractive to corporate fiduciaries and their
shareholders. 20 This Part III explores the foregoing proposition.
A. Private Implementation of Ownership-Broadening Corporate
Finance 21
To understand, first on the aggregate level, how ownershipbroadening corporate finance might be in the profitable interest of major
19. Unutilized Productive Capacity, supra note 6, at 20; Beyond Austerity, supra note 6, at 193;
Ashford, Hall & Ashford, Broadening Capital Acquisition with the Earnings of Capital, supra note
6.
20. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
21. For a fuller description, see Unutilized Productive Capacity, supra note 6; Broadening the Right
to Acquire Capital with the Earnings of Capital: The Missing Link to Sustainable Economic
Recovery and Growth, 39 FORUM FOR SOC.-ECON. 89 (2009); ASHFORD & SHAKESPEARE, supra
note 6 at 236-72. For an analysis of the impact of binary financing in standard micro and
macroeconomic terms, see Robert Ashford & Demetri Kantarelis, Capital Democratization, 37 THE
JOURNAL OF SOC.-ECON. 1624 (2008). For alternate approaches to implementation of binary
financing, see Robert Ashford & Demetri Kantarelis, Enhancing Poor and Middle Class Earning
Capacity with Stock Acquisition Mortgage Loans, 11 ECON., MGMT., & FIN. MKT. 11 (2016) and
see NORMAN G. KURLAND, MICHAEL D. GREANEY & DAWN K. BROHAWN, CAPITAL
HOMESTEADING FOR EVERY CITIZEN: A JUST FREE MARKET SOLUTION FOR SAVING SOCIAL
SECURITY (2004).
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corporations and their shareholders, consider the largest 3,000 or so
creditworthy corporations in the United States. These corporations own
more than 90% of the nation’s investable capital.22 At diminishing unit
costs, most of these corporations could profitably produce much more of
the goods and services that people would purchase if they had the earnings
(market demand) to do so. Presently, almost all capital acquired by these
corporations is acquired with the earnings of capital, and much of it is
acquired with borrowed money repaid with future capital earnings.23 At the
same time, the ownership of this corporate wealth is highly
concentrated: Approximately 1% of the people own 40-50% of the
wealth; 10% own 90% of the wealth, leaving 90% owning little or
none; 24 with many if not most deep in consumer debt. 25 Thus, capital
returns its value at a rate reflective of its long-term (suppressed) earning
capacity as it pays for its acquisition cost primarily for a small minority
of the population (who do not spend enough of their earnings on the
consumption needed to profitably employ the increasingly capitalintensive production).
Because present demand for the employment of labor and capital is
dependent on demand for consumer goods in a future period, a voluntary
pattern of steadily broadening capital acquisition promises more
production-based consumer demand in future years and therefore more
demand for a fuller employment of labor and capital in earlier years. Thus,
if the techniques of corporate finance were opened competitively to all
people, then the present demand for capital investment and employment
would increase in anticipation of the broadening distribution of capital
income to poor and middle class people with unsatisfied consumer needs
22. Russell U.S. Indexes, RUSSELL INVESTMENT, http://www.ftserussell.com/researchinsights/russell-reconstitution/market-capitalization-ranges (last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
23. During the fourteen-year period from 1989 through 2003, in the case of major American
companies, the sources of funds for capital acquisition, in approximate terms, reveal that annually
retained earnings accounted for at least 70 percent or more usually 80 percent of the capital
acquisition. Borrowing accounted for almost all of the rest. Sale of stock as a source of funds never
exceeded five percent and was negative in most years. See R.A. BREALEY, S.C. MYERS & F. ALLEN,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 561-63 (3d ed. 2004).
24. See generally E.N. Wolff, How the Pie Is Sliced: America’s Growing Concentration of
Wealth, AM. PROSPECT 58 (1995); See generally E.N. WOLFF, A TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
REPORT, TOP HEAVY: A STUDY OF THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF WEALTH IN AMERICA (1995);
JASON GONZALES, ECONOMICS OF WEALTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY 1-41 (Nova Science Publishers
Inc. 2011) (citing E.N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the U.S.: Rising Debt and the
Middle Class Squeeze, (Bard Coll. Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 502 (2007)).
25. It is a great and tragic irony that most poor and middle class people are awash in offers of
consumer credit to enable them to acquire what they cannot afford with their limited labor earnings
but bereft of the opportunity to acquire capital that would progressively eliminate the need for
consumer debt.
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and wants. Accordingly, a broader distribution of capital acquisition and
income strengthens the promise of capital to pay for itself with its future
earnings, makes profitable the employment of more capital and labor, and
enhances the prospects of sustainable economic recovery, fuller
employment of labor and capital, and enhanced growth. It will also
therefore increase the market value of well-run corporations and the
wealth of their shareholders within the growing economy. 26
B. The Corporate Fiduciary Duty to Broaden Corporate Share
Ownership
The primary duty of corporate fiduciaries is to not to maximize
share price at every moment in time (sometimes referred to as “shorttermism”), but to develop and implement rational business plans over periods of
time within their discretion to maximize corporate wealth.27 In good economic
times, and even in periods of sluggish growth or recessions, many, if not
most, major credit-worthy corporations have capital acquisition plans that
they might finance with (1) retained earnings (which might otherwise be
distributed as dividends to shareholders), (2) borrowed money and/or (3)
sale of shares. Directors are duty-bound to choose the method that
optimizes corporate wealth. 28 Any creditworthy capital-acquisition plan can
usually be financed with borrowed money, but using retained earnings
and/or selling shares might often better serve corporations and their
shareholders. By reason of synergistic potential between a corporation and
would-be shareholders, it might be in a corporation’s wealth-enhancing
interest to forgo the use of retained earnings and borrowed funds and
instead raise the necessary funds for capital acquisition by selling shares
to investors, for example, to Warren Buffet or Bill Gates. To purchase
such shares, if Warren and Bill prefer not to liquidate existing holdings,
they might borrow the money to purchase the shares; and in light of their
net worth, they are in a position to do so. The share-issuing corporation
would not care if the source of cash is borrowed money rather than the
purchaser’s own assets. The lender would normally insist that the shares be
pledged as security until the loan is repaid and would normally insist on
additional security from the borrower usually via a secured interest in the
borrower’s assets (collateral), but the additional security need not be
26. Beyond Austerity, supra note 6, at 194-95.
27. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, supra note 20.
28. Paramount Commc’ns, supra note 20, at 44; see also eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist
directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards
include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”).
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assets of the wealthy borrower. It could instead be supplied in the form of
capital-credit insurance29 (payable to the lender in the event of default)
with insurance premiums paid either directly by the borrower or by the
lender with the cost passed to the borrower via a higher interest rate. The
binary approach provides an understanding of how poor and middle class
people can also obtain such insurance.30
C. Using Existing Private Institutions
To acquire capital with the future earnings of capital, well-capitalized
corporations and people use:
(1) the future earnings of capital;
(2) collateral;
(3) nonrecourse corporate credit; and
(4) market and insurance mechanisms to diversify and reduce risk.

They also benefit from a proactive government role in protecting
individual freedom and property rights, and in maintaining public goods
including physical, legal, financial, and monetary infrastructure. 31
The same institutions that can work profitably for wellcapitalized corporations and people can also work profitably as poor
and middle class people are included in the capital acquisition process.
Moreover, in an economy operating at less than full capacity, the
principle of binary growth indicates that if capital can competitively pay
for its acquisition costs out of its future earnings primarily for existing
owners, it can do so even more profitably if all people are included in the
capital-acquisition process. 32
Just as investment trustees can act for Warren and/or Bill, they can
also act for poor and middle class people. If poor and middle class people,
represented by qualified trustees (such as mutual fund trustees eager for
29. Although perhaps less familiar to some readers than other institutions that facilitate
corporate finance, capital credit insurance has been available for centuries. Lloyds of London and
AIG are well-known examples. And while the AIG debacle is certainly evidence that capital credit
insurance can be abused and corrupted, few people familiar with the benefits of commerce are
suggesting that the institution of capital credit insurance should be abolished. To the contrary, the
government of the United States has taken steps to preserve and fortify that institution for the
benefit of those who routinely participate in capital acquisition with the earnings of capital even as
they sleep. In light of the beneficial impact of ownership-broadening capital acquisition, that benefit
should also be routinely extended to poor and middle class people.
30. Beyond Austerity, supra note 6, at 195.
31. Id. at 196.
32. Id. at187.
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more business), are able to compete with existing owners for the
acquisition of corporate shares representing the capital requirements of
creditworthy companies, they would bring to the bargaining table
synergistic, wealth-enhancing, corporate opportunities that wellcapitalized people generally cannot offer (namely, a pent-up appetite to
purchase the necessities and simple luxuries of life that richer people
have long enjoyed from capital income). After the acquisition debt
obligations are repaid with the dividends on the binary stock, the
distributed earnings of capital acquired by members of poor and middle
class people will create more production-based consumer demand than if
that capital had been acquired by richer people. More of the capital
earnings, if acquired by richer people, would be invested in investment
opportunities, but the investment opportunities would not be as great in
the context of a narrower distribution of capital ownership and a
consequential, relatively weaker consumer demand. 33
D. Broader Income Distribution Without Redistribution
Lest one confuse the binary approach with a redistribution
approach, it should be noted that if one or more of the corporations
decided to sell shares to Warren rather than Bill as the most
competitive offer (i.e., most consistent with corporate wealthmaximizing goals), B ill could not complain that the transaction was a
redistribution. The corporate fiduciaries would simply inform Bill that
his was not the most competitive (i.e., wealth-maximizing) offer.
Likewise, nor could Warren, Bill, or any other would-be investors
complain of redistribution if the directors determined that the sale of
shares to trustees for the benefit of the binary beneficiaries is the most
competitive offer. 34
E. The Property Interest Acquired by The Binary Beneficiaries
The initial property interest of the beneficiaries of the proposed
ownership-broadening binary financing would be the interest of a trust
beneficiary in the acquired shares of stock but subject to the repayment
of the loan used to acquire the stock. The interest of the beneficiaries is
acquired with debt owed by the constituency trust but not owed by the
beneficiaries. Thus, just as wealthier people are able to acquire capital
with the earnings of capital with non-recourse credit (largely in
33.
34.
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corporate form), so too are the binary beneficiaries. The acquired shares
would be “full-return” common shares of the participating corporation
acquired at fair market value so that there would be no economic
dilution to existing owners. These shares would pay their full return (net
of reserves from revenues for depreciation, research, and development to
maintain the competitive productive capacity of the capital) by first
repaying the capital acquisition loan and then providing capital source
income to supplement wages and welfare benefits paid to the binary
beneficiaries.
Once the acquisition debt is fully paid, the stock might be
distributed to the beneficiaries. However, to promote a continuing and
growing income stream for the beneficiaries from the growing annual
stock acquisitions, prudent legislative policy might generally require the
trust to continue to hold the fully paid shares (at least for some time
period) and rather distribute only the full income on the shares to the
beneficiaries during that period, perhaps with exceptions for share
distribution for hardship and other prescribed circumstances. This
approach might prevent the problem that occurs when shares distributed
to poor people with a pressing immediate need for money for necessities
and/or with little experience in the long-term value of such ownership
are improvidently sold to wealthier people at distress prices (as occurred,
for example, in some former communist nations after the collapse of the
Soviet Union). 35
F. Projecting Binary Growth
Figure 1, set forth below, illustrates the aggregate growthsustaining feature of an ownership-broadening economy.

35. See generally David Satter, The Rise of the Russian Criminal State, PRISM (Sept. 4,
1998),
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=7177&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=
220&no_cache=14 (broadly discussing the failure of privatization initiatives in the wake of the
Soviet Union’s collapse, looking at the manipulation that occurred by criminal syndicates); see also
Michael Alexeev, The Effect of Privatization on Wealth Distribution in Russia, 3-4 (The William
Davidson, Inst., Working Paper No. 86, 1998) (explaining the complexities of transitioning to a
private economy with investors, and therefore also owners, who have little ownership experience).
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Figure 1

Based on the assumptions specified below, Figure 1 shows the
number of years of annual ownership-broadening acquisitions that will have
paid for themselves over time. Figure 1 assumes:
(1) a seven year cost recovery period for capital investment;
(2) in every year after the implementation of the binary economy,
some number, N, of an economy’s creditworthy companies have
profitably utilized binary financing to acquire some percentage, X, of
their capital investments;
(3) the capital credit insurance is profitably priced to repay the lending
banks for those financings that fail to repay their acquisition loans so
that X is net of those failures; and
(4) N, X, and the rate of return on capital remain constant throughout
the period.

Although beginning slowly, the broadening distribution of capital
acquisition and income will increase steadily and thereby provide the
basis for binary growth. Each year after the initial cost recovery period,
an additional year of binary capital will have paid for itself and will be
distributing capital income to poor and middle class people. Consistent
with the assumption of a seven-year capital cost recovery period, Figure 1
shows the steady growth in fully paid-for annual capital acquisitions. In the
eighth year, the first annual acquisition of capital will have paid for itself
and will begin paying its full return to the new owners. In the ninth year,
the second annual capital acquisition will be fully paid for and will
therefore begin paying its full return to the new owners. In fourteen
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years, 50 percent, and in the twenty-eighth year 75 percent, of the annual
capital acquisitions will have paid for themselves, and will begin paying
their full annual return to the new owners, and so on. In the long run, the
linkage between supply (in the form of the incremental productiveness of
capital) and demand (resulting from the increasingly widespread market
distribution of capital income to consumers) approaches 100 percent.
The more binary financing that is undertaken, the greater the
distributional growth effects. If the rate of return on capital investment
increases (as binary principles predict would occur in an ownershipbroadening economy) then the curve shown in Figure 1 would rise more
steeply and approach the specified percentages sooner in time. 36
G. Maintaining Market Share in a Growing Economy
To maintain market share in the projected growing economy, based
on their capital investment planning horizon, producers will have to
increase production and productive capacity before binary income begins
to be distributed to its new owners. Because present demand for capital
goods is positively affected by anticipated future demand for consumer
goods, the broader distribution of capital acquisition and capital income
should be reflected in increased employment of labor and capital within
producers’ capital investment planning horizon. With a capital cost
recovery period of seven years and a capital investment planning horizon
of five years, market incentives for increased capital investment by
producers of consumer goods might materialize for some producers in the
third year. Furthermore, the producers of capital goods needed by the
producers of consumer goods to increase their productive capacity may
experience market incentives for increased capital spending and labor
employment as early as the first year. 37
H. Some Additional Effects
In addition to the steadily increasing distribution of capital income to
poor and middle class people, some additional effects of broader capital
acquisition are set forth below:
(1) As capital income is more broadly distributed to welfare-dependent
people, welfare dependence, government transfer payments, tax rates,
and taxes can be reduced.

36.
37.

Beyond Austerity, supra note 6, at 197-98.
Id. at 198-99.
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(2) As capital income is more broadly distributed to individual
taxpayers, they will pay more in taxes, thereby increasing government
revenues and providing an additional basis for lower tax rates.
(3) With enhanced corporate profitability, wealth, and share value, private
and government-sponsored retirement security will be enhanced.
(4) As poor and middle class people are enabled to participate in more
capital acquisition that is insurable by capital credit insurers at
premium rates that are not cost prohibitive, wealthier investors will
begin to experience competition in acquiring the safest, most insurable
investment. Therefore to fully invest their financial savings, wealthier
investors will need to move further out on the risk curve to riskier
investments thereby providing more financial capital for start-ups and
other entrepreneurial investments.
(5) Greener growth: Although binary growth may raise environmental
concerns, emergence of competitive ownership-broadening investment
alternatives and the resultant broader distribution of capital income will
make (a) greener technologies (presently unutilized and underutilized)
more affordable to those consumers who would prefer them and more
easily financed and (b) (with growing affluence among poor and
middle class people) protective environmental regulation may become
politically more affordable and achievable.
(6) The binary benefits portend a beneficial impact on widely shared longrange concerns regarding projections related to social-security solvency,
rising health care costs, consumer debt and savings rates, government
debt, and government credit-worthiness. This beneficial impact on
these long range concerns may have an immediate, positive market
effect and political effect on important issues subsumed in the national
and global austerity-stimulus debates which in turn affects government
38
policies regarding poverty.

I. The First-Actor-Collective-Action Problem
However, even with the prospect of these widely-shared benefits, a first-actorcollective-action problem would remain that inhibits ownershipbroadening binary financing because there is no guarantee (and good reason
to doubt) that such projected aggregate benefits from ownership-broadening
capital acquisition would be enjoyed proportionally by participating
corporations whose more broadly-distributed shares gave rise to the more
broadly-distributed capital income. For example, if Ford Motor Company
were to encapitalize its employees, customers, and neighbors, those
38.
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beneficiaries would likely spend much of their enhanced income at least
initially on immediate needs of food, clothing, shelter, and so on, and to
the extent they use it to purchase automobiles, they might purchase cars
made by competitors. Nevertheless, as explained below, there is reason to
believe that with cooperative planning among major corporations and
with government leadership, both of these problems may be effectively
addressed.39
The collective-action problem would be somewhat mitigated by the
encapitalization of customers in proportion to their patronage of the goods
and services produced by the participating corporation with dividends paid
to the customers in the form of credits against future purchases. 40 It would
also be mitigated by any tax benefits given to participating corporations
whose dividends on binary shares yield increased government tax
revenues and reduced welfare payments. It would also be mitigated in
company towns and city neighborhoods in which the greater wealth of
“neighbor” residents of the participating corporations results in benefits
to the participating corporations such as (1) lower property and/or other
local tax rates, (2) improved neighborhoods, schools, and hiring
conditions, and (3) lower crime and insurance rates. There would also be
a mitigating direct benefit resulting from motivation, allegiance, and
gratitude that would likely be engendered among employees from being
able to acquire dividend-paying shares of stock with non-recourse credit
on the strength of their employer-company’s earning capacity and from
the good will that might be engendered from the public toward
corporations willing to broaden their share ownership by way of the
ownership-broadening trusts.
But the collective-action problem would not be wholly eliminated
by these mitigating effects. Even if the binary ownership-broadening
approach were widely understood and accepted as theoretically beneficial in
the aggregate, it is therefore reasonable to assume that it would not likely
be voluntarily instituted widely by many corporations until there is
sufficient support on the part of other market participants committed to its
implementation. This critical support would include (1) sufficient
participation in binary financing by the producers of food, clothing,
shelter, health care, transportation, communication, entertainment, and
39. Id. at 200-01.
40. Somewhat like many frequent-flier programs, the ownership broadening trusts could
include customers who have a continuing relationship with corporations like energy utilities,
telephone companies, Internet and entertainment access companies, airlines, major retailers, and
banks. Like credits for mileage flown, dividends can be paid in the form of credits against future
purchases.
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other goods and services that poor and middle class people would
purchase more of if they had the earning capacity to do so, and (2)
sufficient support on the part of investors in those producers.
Nevertheless, this collective-action problem is not a prisoner’s
dilemma in which the actors’ decisions are kept from one another. To the
contrary, if the binary analysis is widely accepted and deemed a
desirable approach to corporate finance in the aggregate as described above
(which is admittedly unlikely to occur until the principles of inclusive
capitalism are widely taught), then the expected benefits become
greater as the ownership-broadening approach becomes more widely
understood and implemented in a coordinated fashion. If the principle of
binary growth is valid, then it would seem that most market participants
would benefit from its widespread implementation; and it would be in
their rational interest to promote coordinated implementation. No major,
high-technology economy is without trade and business associations that
regularly meet, plan, lobby, and act in concert to improve the business
climate for their profit-seeking activities.41 It is noteworthy that the
virtuous, public-spirited decision by CVS Pharmacy to stop selling
tobacco products 42 was widely publicized, and there has been notable
pressure for other businesses to cease tobacco sales (although none yet
have done so). 43 Similarly, consider Chipotle Mexican Grill’s decision to
remove all genetically modified organisms from its menu, 44 and WalMart Stores’s decision to stop selling Confederate flag merchandise in
the wake of the shooting at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal
Church in Charleston, South Carolina, in June of 2015. 45 Based on these
examples, if a single major retailer, auto-maker, pharmaceutical
41. Beyond Austerity, supra note 6, at 201-02.
42. Larry Merlo, Message from Larry Merlo, President and CEO, CVS HEALTH, (Feb. 5,
2014) http://www.cvshealth.com/newsroom/message-larry-merlo.
43. No other major pharmacies or grocery stores have ceased tobacco sales, despite a 2014
push by state attorneys to pressure them to do so. Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen., A.G.
Schneiderman Spearheads National Effort Calling On Major Pharmacies To Stop Selling Tobacco
Products (March 17, 2014), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-spearheadsnational-effort-calling-major-pharmacies-stop-selling.
44. “If Chipotle is in front of the curve as the first to . . . remove GMOs, I think they’ll be
able to steal some market share . . . but I would not be surprised to see others following very
quickly.” Kaitlyn Ugolik, Where Chipotle Leads, Fast Casual Follows, INVESTOR, INST. INV. (May
05, 2015), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/3450680/banking-and-capital-marketscorporations/where-chipotle-leads-fast-casual-follows.html#.Vp7bNlMrJp8.
45. Within a week of the shooting that claimed nine lives, self-proclaimed by the shooter as
motivated by racial discrimination, Wal-Mart announced it would stop selling Confederate flag
merchandise. eBay, Sears, Etsy, Target, and Amazon quickly followed suit. Andrew Lord, 6
Companies Ban Confederate Flag Sales, HUFFINGTON POST (June 23, 2015, 7:25 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/23/retailers-ban-confederate-flags_n_7648614.html.
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company, computer manufacturer, telecommunications company and
entertainment giant were to adopt (and explain to the public the benefits
of) an ownership-broadening financing policy contingent only on a
similar decision by a critical mass of other companies, might not they
soon be joined by their competitors (particularly if encouraged and urged
to do so by advocates for poor and middle class people)?
J.

Government Facilitative Policy

The basic logic underlying the binary benefits that seemingly flow from
ownership-broadening binary financing springs from the confluence of (1)
the three basic principles of inclusive capitalism based on binary
economics, (2) widely accepted principles of finance, (3) the corporate-wealthmaximizing duties of corporate fiduciaries, and (4) the enlightened selfinterest of investors. Nevertheless, to facilitate the benefits of broadening the
distribution of capital acquisition with the earnings of capital, several
government actions would be helpful and desirable.
First, the most notable facilitative government action would be to
eliminate the corporate tax on corporate income paid to the ownershipbroadening trusts to enable the trustees first to repay the share acquisition
loans and then to pay dividends to binary beneficiaries. This tax relief
can be wholly justified on grounds of both economics and justice.
Because the corporations have no use of the income that it passes on to
the trustees, there is no reason to tax it on the corporate level. Moreover,
taxing that corporate income would retard the repayment of the
acquisition debt and reduce the growing capital income paid to the
beneficiaries, which is precisely the economic impetus for the benefits
outlined above.
It is also noteworthy that there are many “second-round ways” that
existing owners receive access to the pretax (untaxed) earnings of capital
by way of investment tax credits, 46 deductions for research and
development, 47 depreciation (often accelerated), 48 offshore (usually
capital) income, 49 executive compensation, 50 and other strategies for

46. I.R.C. § 48 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding 114-92, 114-94, 114-95 and
114-113) 2015).
47. 26 C.F.R. §1.41-2 (2016).
48. I.R.C. § 167 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding 114-92, 114-94, 114-95
and 114-113) 2015).
49. I.R.C. § 911 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding 114-92, 114-94, 114-95
and 114-113) 2015).
50. I.R.C. § 162(m) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding 114-92, 114-94, 11495 and 114-113) 2015).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss2/11

22

Ashford: Why Working But Poor?

2016]

WHY WORKING BUT POOR?

529

“zeroing out” corporate income. 51 These “second-round” ways benefit
people by way of capital ownership once they have acquired capital but
are denied to people who presently have no effective access to the “firstround” of capital acquisition with the earnings of capital that would
enable them to become owners. These second-round ways provide
substantial benefits largely in proportion to existing wealth. These many
ways provide little or no direct benefit to people with little or no
capital ownership. Taxing the corporate income would not only reduce
the access of poor and middle class people to the “first round” of pre-tax
capital acquisition with the earnings of capital, but would also
perpetuate the denial of the second-round benefits and thereby would
have the effect of increasing the severe disparity that results from
denying poor and middle class people the competitive economic
opportunity to acquire capital with the earnings of capital that richer
people routinely enjoy.
Second, to minimize the first-actor-collective-action problem
discussed above, the government might authorize dividends to be paid to
the binary beneficiaries in the form of special script usable only for the
goods and services of qualified producers. Once so used, the script could
then be exchanged by participating corporations for general currency or
bank credit.
Third, to help diversify the investment risk of employees of
participating companies perceived to exist from having too much of their
investment in their employer (the problem of too many eggs in one
basket), the constituency trustees could be allowed to diversify the
investment risk of their beneficiaries by transferring some of the shares to
a “mutualized” account in which employees from multiple participating
employers would own a diversified portfolio of such transferred shares.
Fourth, to facilitate the availability and reduce the cost of private
capital credit insurance, the government might establish a national
ownership-broadening capital credit reinsurance entity modeled after the
FHA home loan reinsurance program.
Fifth, to bring down the cost of credit for ownership broadening
financing, a nation’s central bank might monetize ownership-broadening
loans until they are retired. 52 To benefit from the advantages of
government reinsurance and monetization, qualified binary financing
might be restricted to the economic basics (the essential needs) such as
51. Beyond Austerity, supra note 6, at 202-03.
52. For a description of the financial and economic aspect of central bank monetization of
ownership broadening financing, see Unutilized Productive Capacity, Binary Economics and the Case for
Broadening Capital Ownership, supra note 6.
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food, clothing, shelter, healthcare, education, and energy) and
restrictions might also be based on ecological concerns.
Moreover, as with any government-facilitated program that extends
opportunity to people, eligibility and antidiscrimination rules for
determining beneficiary participation would be needed. 53 Likewise,
rules governing the qualification and duties of binary trustees, lenders,
and capital credit insurers would be seemingly desirable.
K. Shareholder Approval
Of course, depending on state law, some ownership-broadening
transactions are considered extraordinary in the sense that they require
shareholder approval of any such transaction recommended by a
corporation’s directors. 54 Although there is a sound basis for concluding
that (1) corporations, as independent entities, have an inherent interest in
broadening their share ownership to maximize the fuller employment of
their productive capacity and thereby their wealth, and (2) corporate
fiduciaries have the duty to formulate and pursue corporate finance
accordingly, corporate shareholders have no such duty and may not share
their corporations’ ownership-broadening interest. For example, some
shareholders may prefer to own 100% of a corporation worth $100
million than to own only 60% of the same corporation if it is worth $200
million even though in monetary terms their net wealth in the more
broadly owned corporation would be greater. Thus, they may value their
greater percentage ownership of the less valuable corporation more than
the greater market value of their holdings in the same larger, more
broadly owned corporation. More generally, shareholders may prefer
being relatively richer than others (by effectively opposing ownership
broadening) than growing financially richer as ownership is broadened.
But shareholders are not a monolithic group. Other shareholders might
well prefer the 60% share ownership in the $200 million corporation, or
53. For example, under the federal tax code, the contributions or benefits provided under a
plan must not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees. Section 401(a)(4) contains
the test for nondiscrimination that a qualified plan must satisfy. The purpose of this test is to assure
that the benefits provided to highly compensated employees are proportional to those provided to
non-highly-compensated employees. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)(4)-1 (2016).
54. Different states subject different matters to shareholder approval, but common examples
include mergers and charter amendments. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 10.03, 11.04
(2004); see also Patrick L. Cusato, The Economically Dominant Subsidiary: When Can
Shareholders Maintain Control?, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 949, 954-55 (1986) (remarking that
extraordinary transactions at common law required unanimous shareholder approval based on the
traditional theory “that the corporate board’s power was limited to the management of ordinary and
regular business”).
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might prefer being only a little richer in an economy in which poor and
middle class people are considerably richer by reason of their fuller and
more equal opportunity to participate in the capitalist system by being
included in the process of capital acquisition with the earnings of capital.
Moreover, many shareholders are institutional investors that “own the
market” 55 and may believe that the macro-economy will enhance the
value of their aggregate, diversified holdings if there is a systemic
market solution to provide the income distribution to poor and middle
class people needed to support greater market demand for consumption
and therefore greater return on investment. Many such institutional
investors include (1) government and private retirement funds, union
funds, mutual funds that will better serve their dedicated goals with an
increasingly prosperous poor and middle class and (2) charitable
foundations dedicated to social causes including enhancing the interests
of poor people. 56 With widespread teaching and advocacy of the binary
approach to production, income distribution, and growth, shareholders
will be able to make decisions regarding corporate and government
policies and their relationship to income distribution, corporate
profitability, and economic growth in light of a deeper and fuller
economic, legal, and normative understanding and appreciation of the
available alternatives open to them. 57
55. See J. Hawley & A. Williams, The Emergence of Universal Owners: Some Implications
of Institutional Equity Ownership, CHALLENGE: THE MAG. OF ECON. AFF., 43 (2000); J. HAWLEY &
A. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM: HOW INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CAN MAKE
CORPORATE AMERICA MORE DEMOCRATIC (University of Pennsylvania Press 2000).
56. Eric Fox, Introduction to Institutional Investing, INVESTOPEDIA (February 11, 2014),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/financial-theory/11/introduction-institutional-investing.asp;
see also George Soros & Fazle Hasan Abed, Rule of Law Can Rid the World of Poverty, FIN. TIMES
(Sept.
26,
2012),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f78f8e0a-07cc-11e2-835400144feabdc0.html#axzz3ybWnCW4s (“Without basic legal empowerment, the poor live an
uncertain existence, in fear of deprivation, displacement and dispossession.”); see also Inclusive
Economies: Inequality undermines economic opportunity and growth, FORD FOUNDATION,
http://www.fordfoundation.org/work/challenging-inequality/our-approach/inclusive-economies/
(last visited Feb. 13, 2016). (“Economic inequality is pervasive, and in recent decades, has grown
dramatically worldwide and undercut growth.”); see also Open Society Foundations Grant Helps
Move Americans from Poverty to Self Sufficiency, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS (Apr. 4, 2011),
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/press-releases/open-society-foundations-grant-helpsmove-americans-poverty-self-sufficiency. (“The Open Society Foundations awarded an $8 million
grant to Abt Associates today to support efforts to identify effective models for helping low-income,
low-skilled people become more self-sufficient.”). In acknowledging its sponsorship of National
Public Radio Programs, The Ford Foundation is credited with being dedicated to “eliminating
inequality in all of its forms.” One can hope that eliminating the inequality in the competitive ability
to acquire capital with the earnings of capital will be included as one of its priorities. All Things
Considered, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 4, 2016).
57. Robert Ashford, Economics, Democracy, and the Distribution of Capital Ownership, 40
F. FOR SOC.-ECON. 361, 369-370 (2011).
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IV. WHAT CAN ADVOCATES FOR POOR PEOPLE DO TO HELP?
The problem of poverty has been with us for so long, that it might
be fairly said that if advocates for poor people are not doing something
out of the ordinary, they may (despite their sincerest motivations)
unwittingly be a part of the problem. One symptom of insanity has been
identified as doing the same thing repeatedly and expecting a different
result.
One of the most important duties of lawyers is to assist their clients
in identifying and securing their essential rights and responsibilities. 58
To fulfill this duty it is often necessary for lawyers to identify facts,
principles, and theories that those who would impede their clients’
interests are not talking about.
Most poor and middle class adults know that there are rights to
food stamps, other welfare rights, unemployment compensation, and job
training. 59 Most know about prospects of raising the minimum wage, the
employment benefits of education, and the helpfulness of a raise in
pay. 60 The same can be said about attorneys, legal scholars, law schools
and clinics dedicated to serving their rights and interests.
I believe that the most important economic right that poor and
middle class people (including their advocates) need, but do not know
they need, is the competitive right to acquire capital with the earnings of
capital. As a consequence, they do not know to ask and press for it.
This right is not a fanciful right. Credit-worthy corporations are
constantly acquiring capital with the earnings of capital. Indeed, a major
purpose of corporate finance is to enable corporations to acquire capital
on credit before they have earned the money to pay for it and then to
58. Robert Ashford, Socio-Economics: What Is Its Place in Law Practice?, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 611, 615 (1997).
59. For example, increased awareness of eligibility for Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP) (the technical term for food stamps) has been attributed for the increased
enrollment among eligible individuals over the last decade or so, up to 83% in 2012. Policy Basics:
Introduction to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), CTR. ON BUDGET AND
POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-introduction-to-thesupplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap.
60. Lydia Saad, In U.S., 71% Back Raising Minimum Wage, GALLUP (Mar. 6, 2013),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/160913/back-raising-minimum-wage.aspx?ref=mn-clientservices#!mntopics (“Seven in 10 Americans say they would vote “for” raising the minimum wage to $9 per hour
if given the opportunity, while 27% would vote against such a bill”); see also New Poll Shows
Political Benefits to Supporting a Federal Minimum Wage Increase in 2016 Election, OXFAM
AMERICA (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.oxfamamerica.org/press/new-poll-shows-political-benefits-tosupporting-a-federal-minimum-wage-increase-in-2016-election/ (“Eighty-seven percent of general
election voters support at least one proposal for a federal minimum wage increase” to either $9, $10,
$12 or $15).
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repay the loan obligations with the future earnings of the capital
acquired. By way of shareholder participation in the corporate form of
doing business, this right is also realized constantly by people roughly in
proportion to their existing wealth even as they sleep. But it is not
realized by wages, job training, education, student loans, assistance with
child care, raising the minimum wage, or ending racial, gender, or other
invidious discrimination. If ever the competitive right to acquire capital
with the earnings of capital is to be realized for poor and middle class
people, it must first be talked about in mainstream political and
economic discourse; but presently in mainstream political and economic
discourse and in most legal scholarship offered to help poor people, it is
definitely not being talked about.
And yet this “law and economic,” property-right is the essence of
capitalism. For the present, younger professors, the Cold War (that
largely shaped twentieth century global history) may be a fading epoch
of history; but at least some of the most senior professors (and I among
them) remember times when as grade school students we were taught to
crouch under tables in air-raid drills in preparation for the nuclear
attacks from the communist Soviet Union that thankfully never came.
And some may even remember the slogans of “better red than dead”
espoused by some (primarily in England) who believed capitalism was
on the wrong side of history. But the leaders of the United States and its
allies disagreed; their policy was “better dead than red.” For what, it
should be asked, was it worth risking nuclear devastation? The answer is
a cluster of personal rights that include at its economic core, the private
right to acquire capital with the earnings of capital. This, at its economic
and property right core, is the legal distinction between communism and
capitalism—not the right to a job or to work, or to receive public
education, job training, welfare or other government payments and
assistance, or to own a home, car or other consumer products. These
rights were all recognized in communist economies. The fundamental
economic and property issue at stake during the Cold War on the grand
scale of economic policy was whether the right to acquire capital with
the earnings of capital should remain privatized or be outlawed. And yet
in mainstream discourse, that right is almost never articulated as such. It
is therefore not surprising that poor and middle class people (and their
advocates) have little basis to identify this right and believe that it might
be as important to their living well as it is to well-capitalized people. 61

61. Binary economics has received scant critical attention from professional economists (i.e.,
from persons with a Ph.D. in economics from an accredited educational institution). For two recent
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One reason that the right to acquire capital with the earnings of
capital is not more widely accepted is that mainstream economic
discourse is trapped in a prison of pre-conceptions (a pre-conceptual
box) that might be called the left-right linear economic paradigm. This
conceptual box recognizes two extremes (austerity and stimulus) and
admits of no alternative except some mix of the two located somewhere
in between. Based on this conceptual foundation, there are a series of
debates that structure and polarize mainstream analysis: the stimulusausterity debate, 62 the regulation-deregulation debate, 63 the governmentfavorable articles see Robert Ashford & Demetri Kantarelis, Capital Democratization, 37 THE
JOURNAL OF SOC.-ECON. 1624 (2008). For alternate approaches to implementation of binary
financing, see Robert Ashford & Demetri Kantarelis, Enhancing Poor and Middle Class Earning
Capacity with Stock Acquisition Mortgage Loans, 11 ECON., MGMT., & FIN. MKT. 11 (2016) In A
Supply-Sider’s (Sympathetic) View of Binary Economics, 25 J. OF SOCIO-ECON. 55, 66 (1996),
economist Timothy P. Roth, took a sympathetic view but found its theoretical underpinnings lacking
and expressed serious concerns that government efforts to encourage its implementation would
become dysfunctionally politicized. In Democratic Capitalism vs. Binary Economics, 30 J. OF
SOCIO-ECON. 99, 99-100 (2001), Keith Wilde and R. G. Schulte, declared that the binary proposals
“may be the best available instrument for preserving the open society that is essential for a stable
and democratic capitalism” but lamented that this “brilliant innovation in economic policy, backed
up by expertise in financial and legal principles, has been side-tracked by promoting it as an
innovation in economic theory.” The only critique by a professional economist to reject the binary
prediction of binary growth appeared in Binary Economics: Paradigm Shift Or Cluster of Errors, 8
Q. J. OF AUSTRIAN ECON. 31, 41-43 (2005). In that Article, Timothy D. Terrell opined that the
binary proposals would lead to a “massive credit bubble,” severe inflation, and then widespread
bankruptcy. From the perspective of advocates for poor people, however, the credibility of Terrell’s
analysis should be considered in light of the principles of Austrian Economics on which it rests,
which assume (1) an economy otherwise operating at full capacity and equilibrium in which (2) all
unemployment is voluntary, and (3) governmental redistributive policies to assist poor people
(except perhaps regarding education) are misguided and counter-productive. The failure of
mainstream professional economists to consider the binary approach does not relieve advocates of
poor people from their responsibilities to their clients. In this regard, ABA MODEL RULE 2.1,
Comment [4] concludes with the following admonition: “Where consultation with a professional in
another field is itself something a lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a
recommendation. At the same time, a lawyer’s advice at its best often consists of recommending a
course of action in the face of conflicting recommendations of experts.”
62. James Midgley, Austerity Versus Stimulus: Theoretical Perspectives and Policy
Implications, 41 J. SOC. & SOC. 11, 11 (2014) (“Advocates of austerity policies urge governments to
retrench public spending, ease taxes and regulations and adopt other measures that will restore
business confidence prompting entrepreneurship, investment and economic revitalization . . . [o]n
the other hand, advocates of stimulus policies urge governments to increase public spending through
borrowing in order to create employment, maintain incomes and stimulate consumption so that
demand for goods and services will increase and foster growth and prosperity.”).
63. The back and forth between proponents and opponents of government regulation dates to
the Civil War and continues through the present day. Proponents say that the “appropriate response
to market failure is regulation because regulation not only protects entitlements, redistributes
wealth, promotes economic efficiency, and responds to interest-group pressures but also is
paternalistic and may shape and/or discourage certain preferences . . . . Proponents of deregulation
point to ‘regulatory failure’ as a justification for the market approach because regulation (1)
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anti-government debate, 64 the free-trade-fair-trade-protectionist debate, 65
and of course the welfare debate between (1) those who see poverty as a
structural and institutional problem and who believe that more
government assistance is needed and (2) those who see more
government assistance as excessive, unaffordable, and destructive of
motivation and incentives for greater productivity and therefore a part of
the problem. 66 Although they disagree on many things, the participants
in these polarized debates share a common, albeit unarticulated, premise

suppresses innovation, (2) denies price and quality options, (3) encourages wasteful competition, (4)
produces resource misallocations, (5) shelters and encourages inefficiency, and (6) encourages a
wage/price spiral.” Stephen G. Wood, Don C. Fletcher & Richard F. Holley, Regulation,
Deregulation and Re-Regulation: An American Perspective, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 381, 386-88
(1987) (emphasis added); see also President George Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 28, 1992), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20544
(calling for a moratorium on anti-growth domestic regulation).
64. Susan Page, How Big Government Should Be Stirs Debate, USA TODAY (Oct. 11, 2014,
1:53
PM)
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-10-111Abiggovernment11_CV_N.htm (dissecting a Gallup poll wherein: 22% of Americans want
government out of their lives while 20% want government that protects its citizens; 58% of those
surveyed say the government is doing too many things that should be left to individuals and
businesses while 36% say the government should do more to solve the country’s problems); see
also President Barack Obama, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union (Jan. 28, 2014) (“For several years now, this town has been consumed by a rancorous
argument over the proper size of the federal government. It’s an important debate . . . .”).
65. Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Fair Trade-Free Trade Debate: Trade,
Labor, and the Environment, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 61, 61 (1996) (“The fair trade claims that
currently generate the most heated debates in the trade community are those related to
environmental and labor standards. The Economist magazine recently noted that ‘labour standards
and environmental issues are playing an increasing role in international trade disputes’ and are
likely to be the central area of conflict between developed and developing countries in the next
decade . . . . Most free traders see recent demands that trade be linked to compliance with
environmental and labor standards as motivated by the desire to protect jobs at home against
increased competition from the Third World and view many fair traders as charlatans (protectionists
masquerading as moralists). Where the demands of fair traders cannot so easily be reduced to
protectionist pretexts, free traders are inclined to portray the advocates of linkage as irrational moral
fanatics, prepared to sacrifice global economic welfare and the pressing needs of the developing
countries for trivial, elusive, or purely sentimental goals.”). For an excellent analysis of the
questionable free-trade benefits flowing from the widely accepted principles of comparative
advantage, see generally Robert E. Prasch, Reassessing the Theory of Comparative Advantage, 8
REVIEW OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 37 (1996).
66. See, e.g., Thomas Corbett, Informing the Welfare Debate: Perspectives on the
Transformation of Social Policy, INST. FOR RES. ON POVERTY (Apr. 1997),
http://www.irp.wisc.edu/research/welreform/national/informingwd.htm ([T]he welfare debate
“touches the most sensitive of societal issues: work, family, sex, abortion, personal responsibility,
and community integrity. Welfare reform has become a proxy for fundamental questions about
quality of life and how to allocate personal and public responsibilities.”); see also Michael Tanner,
When Welfare Undermines Work Ethic, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2013 7:00 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/05/05/denmarks-work-life-balance/when-welfareundermines-work-ethic.
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that broadening the distribution of capital income with the earnings of
capital will not enhance the earning capacity of poor and middle class
people and will not promote a fuller employment of labor and capital
and economic growth. Otherwise, the prospect of broadening the
distribution of capital acquisition with the earnings of capital would be a
part of the conversation; and it is not. To adequately serve their clients,
advocates for poor people need to be willing to think outside the
mainstream, economic box. This in turn sometimes requires the courage
and honesty to resist the comfortable social temptation to conform one’s
thinking to what the group thinks. 67
In light of the persistence of poverty, despite (1) the great promise
of abundance and leisure seemingly offered by the Industrial Revolution,
and (2) the efforts of many well-motivated people to address the
appalling problem of poverty over several centuries, to those advocates
for poor people who recognize that the need to do something out of the
ordinary, joining the effort to learn and teach the principles of inclusive
capitalism based on binary economics should have some appeal. A
widely shared mission of advocates for poor people dedicated to helping
include the principles of inclusive capitalism based on binary economics
as a recognized and respected, indispensable place in legal education and
higher education would certainly change the mainstream economic
debate.
V. CONCLUSION
Once the principles of inclusive capitalism are articulated in
mainstream discourse, an economic analysis of the beneficial impact of
democratizing capital acquisition with the earnings of capital will
convince growing numbers of people that (1) the continued
concentration of this right, as a practical matter, for the benefit of people
roughly in proportion to their existing wealth is a substantial
unarticulated barrier to increasing the earning capacity of the vast
majority of people and the alleviation of poverty, and (2) as a practical
matter, this right can be democratized by way of voluntary transactions
and without redistribution to extend to all people the equal protection of
the same laws that present primarily benefit well-capitalized people
substantially in proportion to their existing wealth. This enhanced
understanding of the importance of the competitive right to acquire
capital with the earnings of capital has the potential to produce systemic

67.

See, e.g., Irving L. Janis, Groupthink, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Nov. 1971, at 43-46, 74-76.
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change in the political environments so as to establish an inclusive
capitalist economy structured to operate via voluntary transactions and
without redistribution not only (a) to substantially enhance the earning
capacity of poor and middle class people (by supplementing their labor
income and any transfer payments they may receive increasingly with
capital income), but also (b) to reduce unemployment, raise wages,
enhance working conditions, reduce taxes and tax rates, and promote
sustainable economic growth. Legal scholars, lawyers, law schools, law
school clinics, and advocates for poor people have the duties to teach
students and clients, to advocate, and to work to implement the
principles of inclusive capitalism explained in this article.
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